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In early June 2014 the insurgent forces of the self-declared ‘Islamic State’ (IS) launched an offensive in Northern Iraq,​[1]​ smashing the US-trained Iraqi Army, capturing substantial stocks of its arms and vehicles, and conquering a swathe of territory in the country’s Sunni Arab heartland.​[2]​ IS, which had emerged from the civil war in Syria, subsequently advanced against both the autonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Kirkuk and the Democratic Union Party (PYD), a Syrian Kurdish party that has established control of its own enclave on the Turkish border. On 7 August US President Barack Obama ordered air-strikes against IS, and the American air campaign was subsequently augmented by Western and Arab allies.​[3]​ With this external assistance, the Kurdish forces in Iraq and Syria (the peshmerga and the PYD’s People’s Protection Units, or YPG) have been able to withstand the IS onslaught at the time of writing, and the USA, Britain and other allies have committed themselves principally to training and equipping the Kurds. The US is also reportedly planning to train Syrian rebel factions fighting both IS and Bashar al-Assad’s Baath regime.​[4]​

	The use of surrogate forces in internal conflicts has been a consistent characteristic of counter-insurgency (COIN), whether waged domestically or by an interventionist state or coalition. However, the multilateral war effort against IS remains hampered by a series of politico-military problems. The first is the progressively more convoluted linkage between an increasingly barbaric war in Syria pitting Assad’s regime against an array of rebel factions, and the resurgence of violent Sunni-Shia animosities in neighbouring Iraq. The second involves IS’s military capabilities, with its 30-45,000 fighters now in possession of armour and artillery seized from the Iraqi military,​[5]​ and also augmented by several thousand foreign volunteers who could potentially return to their home countries and conduct terrorist attacks against their fellow citizens. The third, with respect to Iraq, is that although the Iraqi armed forces should ideally be the main source of external assistance, the incompetence and corruption of its officer corps makes it a poor partner for the USA and its allies.​[6]​ 

It is not surprising that the comparatively more combat-effective Kurdish fighters have become the main recipients of Western aid, both in Iraq and Syria, although this in turn has political implications on both sides of the old Sykes-Picot frontier.​[7]​ These are not only evident with the contempt that peshmerga soldiers feel for their Iraqi Arab counterparts,​[8]​ but also because Kurdish aspirations for independence have significant implications for the territorial integrity of both Iraq and Syria. The PYD’s links with the PKK, fighting for independence from Turkey, and the ill-disguised hostility with which the former is regarded by Ankara, also provide the grounds for further friction between the USA and its main NATO ally in the region, not to mention further complications in the already fraught relationship between the Syrian and Iraqi Kurdish movements.​[9]​ In the latter’s case, Kurdish aspirations for independence from Iraq are likely to be encouraged by both the war against IS, and the decrepitude of the Shiite Arab-dominated government in Baghdad.​[10]​

	Both the Iraq and Syria conflicts are further complicated by the existence of pro-government militias. Defections and desertions from the Syrian Arab Army have compelled Assad to rely not only on the ‘National Defence Forces’ (NDF, reportedly at least 60-80,000 strong) recruited mainly from his Alawite minority,​[11]​ but also foreign fighters in the form of Iraqi auxiliaries and the military wing of the Lebanese Shiite party Hezbollah, itself a recipient of arms and funds from Damascus since the mid-1980s.​[12]​ Iran itself has committed itself to backing both the Syrian and Iraqi governments; the former being a long-standing ally of the Iranian Islamic Republic, whilst the latter’s Shiite-dominated government has developed increasingly close ties with Iraq’s historical enemy.​[13]​ Tehran has sent advisors from its Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to liaise with both countries’ armed forces,​[14]​ and also to train auxiliary forces such as the Syrian NDF and Iraqi Shiite paramilitaries, collectively known as the Hashid al-Shabi.​[15]​ As such, the COIN campaign against IS in Iraq had become interlinked not only with the Syrian civil war, but also the proxy conflict pitting Iran and its ‘resistance’ allies (the Baathist regime in Damascus and Hezbollah) against its predominantly Sunni Arab foes.​[16]​ 

	Within international politics there is an established norm that the state has the sole legitimate authority to use military force, and that it alone possesses (as the German sociologist Max Weber noted in 1919) ‘a monopoly of violence’.​[17]​ However, in a variety of historical and recent internal conflicts weak states have sub-contracted military force to irregular auxiliary formations. The use of these paramilitary groups, or militias, has been the subject of academic analysis,​[18]​ and given the current characteristics of the international system their existence and employment is likely to be a facet of future conflict. Western reliance on indigenous forces in Iraq now derives in part from popular war-weariness in the USA and other Western powers, deriving largely from the costly and prolonged engagement of combat troops in Afghanistan (2001-2014) and Iraq (2003-2011). The current crisis in Ukraine, the sharp decline in Russo-Western relations, Moscow’s threats against its neighbours, and the renewed significance of NATO’s mission of collective defence, may well also reinforce this preference for advising and equipping local allies involved in COIN campaigns against adversaries such as IS or Boko Haram.​[19]​ 

However, some governments rely on militias for their own internal defence because of the inadequacies of their own regular military forces, which are often the product of peacetime policies; these can include ‘coup-proofing’ and also the preferential treatment of selected communities deemed loyal to the authorities. The resort to irregular paramilitaries may therefore work as a short-term stratagem to avert imminent defeat and overthrow, but in the long term it contributes to the erosion of governmental authority and makes state failure more likely, as the use of militias serves only to exacerbate existing social tensions and to further de-legitimise the state authorities. These trends have been observed in past conflicts (notably Afghanistan and Sierra Leone), and the author argues that they are apparent in Syria, Iraq, Nigeria and other conflicts today.

This article therefore sets the context for both the current conflict against IS and Assad’s fight for survival by examining how militias have been employed by states in successive internal conflicts, assessing both their utility and their drawbacks. It will conclude by outlining the potential implications of the current conflicts in the Arab world, notably in Iraq and Syria, and in particular the effect of militia activity on state stability.  


Militias in their historical context:

Western armed forces are primarily configured for major combat operations and inter-state warfare, rather than gendarmerie-style tasks related to internal warfare. Furthermore, since the end of World War II North American and European militaries have progressively shrunk in size, relying on technology and firepower to compensate for smaller all-volunteer forces (the USA abolished selective service in 1973, the UK phased out national service a decade earlier).​[20]​ While this model suits liberal democracies where casualty sensitivity and popular resentment over conscription can hamper engagement in prolonged conflicts, Western militaries lack the numbers and the awareness of the ‘human terrain’ which is required when prosecuting COIN in a foreign country. The logical solution to these limitations on manpower and local knowledge is to recruit indigenous forces that provide substitutes for mass, and also address the shortcomings in linguistic and cultural understanding that external powers experience whenever they intervene on behalf of an allied government waging internal warfare.​[21]​ These local forces can include regular military and police units, or auxiliaries raised on an ad hoc basis.

One of the perennial features of imperial history is the ability of states waging wars of conquest to either co-opt local allies, or to recruit subjugated peoples to fight in their armies.​[22]​ More recently, the Afghan and Iraq wars led both the American and British armed forces to stress the importance of training and equipping indigenous armies and constabularies to safeguard internal security once interventionist forces have withdrawn.​[23]​ The US blunder in dismantling the Iraqi armed forces in May 2003,​[24]​ the contentious circumstances behind the British Army’s withdrawal from Basra and handover to the post-Baathist Iraqi Army (2007-2009),​[25]​ and the poor showing of the latter in recent combat operations against IS demonstrates that this process is often a convoluted and difficult one to manage.

	The establishment of regular security forces by an interventionist state or coalition can be undermined by the weakness of the host nation government (possibly over-dependent on foreign assistance, and potentially afflicted by corruption, factionalism and other debilitating problems) and its security forces. In Afghanistan, the national police were reported by their NATO patrons to be prone to drug abuse, predatory behaviour against the civil population, and also collaboration with the Taliban. The Afghan National Army (ANA) was ostensibly a more reliable partner (despite occasional ‘green-on-blue’ attacks on NATO allies), although in its operations in the Pashtun South it has been hampered by its dominance by Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara soldiers.​[26]​ The Afghan and Iraqi conflicts suggested that irregular armed units – recruited on tribal and clan lines – were better at protecting communities from insurgent attack than regular troops, particularly if the latter were predominantly drawn from different ethnic or sectarian groups. These included Afghan Local Police units raised in August 2010 (based on the community defence forces (arbakai) that traditionally kept the peace amongst the Pashtun tribes),​[27]​ and also the ‘al-Anbar Awakening’ and the ‘Concerned Local Citizens’ self-defence groups within the Sunni Arab community that US military officials had enlisted in Iraq during the ‘surge’ of 2006-2007 (numbering 91,000 by March 2008, and 118,000 the following year).​[28]​

	Empires, superpowers, post-colonial states, democracies, dictatorships and weak states alike have all employed militias, defined here as armed third parties that are not formally a component of the government’s security forces, but are nonetheless aligned with them in an intra-state conflict. The establishment of these auxiliary paramilitary groups has often transcended national, racial and ethnic differences, particularly in cases where the ‘government’ is that of a colonial or an external interventionist power. Furthermore, and with reference to Weber’s statement on the ‘monopoly of violence’ in his 1919 lecture ‘Politics as a Vocation’, in conditions of civil strife governments often determine which armed groups are licit and which are otherwise; enlisting the former to fight the latter. Weber delivered ‘Politics as a Vocation’ at a time when Germany was in a state of civil war, and while the Weimar regime were employing paramilitary groups of ex-servicemen (the Freikorps) both to suppress far-left revolutionaries and to defend the nascent Republic against external security threats, notably from the newly-independent state of Poland.​[29]​ 

Militias have featured historically and more recently in a variety of COIN conflicts waged by Britain, France, Portugal, Germany, the USA, the USSR (against the Central Asian Basmachi guerrillas in the 1920s,​[30]​ as well as the Afghan mujahidin seventy years later),​[31]​ Russia (during the Second Chechen war from 1999 onwards),​[32]​ Yemen,​[33]​ the self-declared state of Rhodesia (1965-1980),​[34]​ Turkey (in its response to the PKK insurgency), Ethiopia,​[35]​ Uganda,​[36]​ and Sudan.​[37]​ They have also emerged in cases where multinational polities have collapsed as part of a process of state-building and civil strife, as was the case with the paramilitary groups of Central and Eastern Europe after the First World War, and also in the former Yugoslavia and USSR after 1991.​[38]​ Militias have therefore been involved in an array of conflicts, either acting as surrogates to a state’s military, police and intelligence services, or sometimes emerging autonomously as armed factions beyond the control of the state (notably the Loyalist terrorist groups in Northern Ireland from 1969 to 1998, or the Shia factions involved in the sectarian civil war in Iraq in 2005-2007).​[39]​ This article excludes any paramilitary forces which are still nominally under state authority and are subordinate to a military chain of command. Examples here include the Freikorps of Weimar Germany, the ‘Black and Tans’ and the Royal Irish Constabulary Auxiliaries fighting alongside British crown forces during the Irish War of Independence (1918-1922),​[40]​ the Selous Scouts in Rhodesia (active from 1973-1980),​[41]​ and the Koevoet unit established by the South West Africa Police during the Namibian War of Independence (active from 1979-1990).​[42]​ 

Militias can consist of home guard formations are usually recruited from the local adult male population for the static defence of villages, hamlets, or urban neighbourhoods. The British recruited ‘town guards’ in the Cape Colony during the Boer War of 1899-1902,​[43]​ and also raised similar formations during their COIN campaigns in Malaya (1948-1960) and in Kenya (with the Kikuyu Home Guard, or KHG).​[44]​ The French established civil defence groups in Indochina during the war against the Viet Minh (1946-1954),​[45]​ and in South Vietnam during the early 1960s President Ngo Dinh Diem raised a Civil Guard and a Self-Defence Corps (SDC) to fight the Viet Minh’s successor, the National Liberation Front (better known as the Viet Cong).​[46]​ More recently, the Turkish military and security raised the Kurdish village guards as part of their COIN campaign against the PKK.​[47]​

	These formations can however also consist of more mobile and heavily-armed paramilitary groups. In the case of the Montagnards (the aboriginal tribes of the Vietnamese Central Highlands recruited by US Army Special Forces during the early 1960s), they can be recruited on tribal and ethnic lines.​[48]​ Further examples of militias include two Vietnamese syncretistic religious sects – the Cao Đài and Hòa Hảo – and the Binh Xuyen organised crime syndicate (all three of which were co-opted by the French to fight the Viet Minh during the late 1940s),​[49]​ the Afghan militias employed by the USA during the early phases of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001-2002,​[50]​ the pro-Moscow auxiliaries raised by the Russian authorities during the second Chechen War (1999 onwards),​[51]​ and the enlistment of Sunni Arab tribes in al-Anbar province by the US military during the latter phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom, with the latter exploiting local outrage arising from the fanaticism and atrocities committed by al-Qaeda fighters and their insurgent allies.​[52]​

Militias can also consist of former insurgent groups which have defected to fight for the government and/or external interventionists engaged in a COIN campaign. During World War II the Serbian Cetniks and the Albanian Balli Kombetar aligned with the Axis occupation forces in Yugoslavia and Albania in order to destroy the Communist partisans led by Marshal Tito and Enver Hoxha.​[53]​ In their African colonial wars (1961-1974) the Portuguese established the Trupos Especiais (consisting of 1,200 former insurgents based in the Angolan enclave of Cabinda), the ex-guerrilla Grupos Especiais who fought in Angola and Mozambique, and the flechas recruited by the Portuguese security police from the Bushmen of Eastern Angola. In the latter conflict UNITA sided with the Portuguese military against its rival, the MPLA, during the early 1970s.​[54]​ 

With this point in mind analysts should remember that opportunistic alliances of convenience or implicit truces may emerge between factions in civil wars, which allow the parties concerned to concentrate their efforts against a common enemy without an overt alignment. In Syria, the Assad regime has had a murky relationship with Islamist extremists, as a decade ago it provided covert assistance to jihadi volunteers travelling to Iraq to fight US and Coalition troops.​[55]​ Although there have been clashes between Baathist security forces and IS during the current Syrian conflict, Assad has confined his military campaign to targeting IS’s rivals within the rebel movement. This is partly because it is in his interests to have an insurgency dominated by IS – thereby confirming Damascus’ propaganda about a rebellion led by ‘terrorists’ – but also because the Baath regime and IS have a shared objective in weakening and destroying the secular and the less extreme Islamist groups that emerged from the 2011 uprising.​[56]​ 

Historical experience also shows cases where states use smaller armed groups consisting either of auxiliary volunteers or former insurgents who have been ‘turned’ and encouraged (or coerced) into changing sides after capture by the security forces. The roles of these ‘counter-gangs’ involve reconnaissance, the tracking down of insurgent cells, and surgical strikes intended to kill or capture enemy personnel.​[57]​ Examples include the Philippines Constabulary raised by the US Army to fight Filipino rebels in the early 20th century,​[58]​ the Special Night Squads of British Army-Jewish commandos recruited during the Arab insurgency in Palestine (1936-1939),​[59]​ the ‘Q Patrols’ of Greek Cypriot loyalists and ex-EOKA fighters employed by the British during the Cyprus insurgency (1955-1959), the ‘counter-gangs’ raised by Frank Kitson and other British Army and Special Branch officers in Kenya (in which former Mau Mau were inducted to track down their comrades),​[60]​ and the Provincial Reconnaissance Units (many of whom were ex-Viet Cong) established by US special forces and the CIA in the latter phase of the Vietnam war (1968-1972).​[61]​


The utility of militias:

From a cynic’s perspective, militias can have the advantage of being cheap, expendable and deniable, as they can be employed to indirectly intimidate the civilian population into acquiescence, whilst providing a more cost effective means of combating an insurgency. Militia irregulars are generally less expensive to train – and also often considered by the authorities to be of lesser importance – than a state’s military or police personnel. The KHG clearly fitted these criteria as far as the British war effort against the Mau Mau was concerned, as did the harkis recruited by the French in Algeria during the war against the FLN insurgency (1954-1962).​[62]​ However, even if one considers contemporary Western norms concerning the laws of armed conflict, and the fact that current US and British doctrine emphasises the ‘population-centric’ approach of conflict termination and resolution rather than the use of coercive violence,​[63]​ the enlistment of indigenous militias can have the following benefits.

	With intelligence, a general rule of COIN is that the side which dominates in human intelligence (HUMINT) has the advantage over its adversary. The challenge for the government side is to identify the personnel, organisation and aims of the adversary;​[64]​ to understand the political and cultural characteristics of the indigenous society (particularly important for any external military personnel involved in COIN); and above all to ensure that insurgents and terrorists are not able to infiltrate the security forces and recruit informants within their ranks.​[65]​ Locally-recruited militias often have a better knowledge of the physical and human terrain, particularly compared to soldiers and marines from external powers, especially if they are employed in their own territory or neighbourhoods. During the Dhofar conflict in Oman (1965-1975) the firqat forces recruited from the local tribes proved overall to be valuable sources of HUMINT for the Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) and its British military advisors; even if at times the latter considered to Dhofari militiamen to be somewhat grudging and selective about the intelligence they passed on. Although the firqats were never entirely trusted, the information they provided was of crucial importance to the Sultanate and its British backers. To take one example, a tip-off from two firqat fighters led to the unravelling of an insurgent network in Northern Oman by the Sultan’s security forces in December 1972-January 1973.​[66]​

Counter-gang formations have a clear appeal to security forces, as they offer a more discriminate and precise means of locating and neutralising small guerrilla groups than conventional combat tactics. While British Army sweeps through the Aberdare district of Kenya during 1953 failed to locate Mau Mau, the counter-gangs raised by Kitson and other Army and police officers subsequently enabled the British colonial authorities to eliminate the remainder of the insurgents.​[67]​ Another good example of the precision which formations of ‘turned’ and loyalist personnel can offer is that of the Philippines Scouts, consisting mainly of Macabebe tribesmen. The Scouts’ effectiveness can be gauged by their role in capturing the leader of the nationalist insurgency, Emilio Aguinaldo, in March 1901.​[68]​ In South Vietnam from 1965-1971 the US Marine Corps’ Combined Action Program, which involved mixed platoons of marines and local villagers, required a mere 4% of the Corps’ manpower in Vietnam to these formations. Yet the Combined Action Program, in conjunction with other irregular forces, inflicted around 30% of the Viet Cong’s losses during the war.​[69]​

Militias as a whole can also augment force numbers, freeing better-trained military and constabulary personnel for more offensive operations.​[70]​ In Northern Nigeria the armed forces have raised a local paramilitary unit (the ‘Civilian Joint Task Force’) to fight Boko Haram, and also to offset the army’s shortage of manpower.​[71]​ These formations can sometimes also interact more effectively with indigenous communities – gaining the latter’s trust and support – than regular military or constabulary personnel. In Dhofar during the early 1970s the irregular firqat fighters recruited from the local tribes were more effective at policing and security the jebeli nomads than the ethnic Arab and Baluchi soldiers of the SAF.​[72]​ 

Indigenous militias can potentially offer the prospects of a political solution. If the government can persuade substantial numbers of its foes to change sides, this can foster the prospects of reconciliation, particularly if the former promises an amnesty, or pledges socio-economic reforms and national reconciliation. Pragmatic policies such as these can exacerbate internal disputes within an insurgency whilst also providing a means of conflict termination. COIN practitioners stress that ‘turning’ insurgents is not only more economical than killing them, but that every adversary who defects or surrenders voluntarily represents a net gain for the government side, and a proportionate loss for the insurgency. As one British special forces veteran from the Dhofar war noted in his memoirs: 

Persuading a man to join you is far cheaper than killing him. Words are far less expensive than bullets, let alone shells and bombs. Then, too, by killing him you deprive the enemy of one soldier. If he is persuaded to join the Government forces the enemy again becomes one less, but the Government forces become one more, a gain of plus two.​[73]​

Policies of reconciliation therefore provide a practical demonstration of the willingness of the authorities to rectify grievances and to reintegrate former foes into civil society. In the Philippines during the 1950s the Defence Minister Ramon Magsaysay and his US military advisors rewarded Hukbalahap guerrillas who voluntarily capitulated by giving them land to farm. In Oman after July 1970, Sultan Qaboos bin Said gained considerable popular goodwill by pledging to spend oil revenues on social development programmes. His offer of an amnesty also split the insurgent movement (PFLO) in Dhofar, which was already divided between nationalist-minded tribesmen and hard-line Marxist-Leninist ideologues.​[74]​

In the same way that civil development and ‘hearts and minds’ operations are futile if the state lacks the means needed to protect the civilian population from insurgent violence, a core of ‘true believers’ will invariably fight to the bitter end regardless of whether any of their comrades can be persuaded to defect and join pro-government militias.​[75]​ Reconciliation policies in ‘turning’ insurgents also require politicians and military commanders to demonstrate the same degree of enlightened self-interest displayed by Magsaysay against the Hukbalahap and Sultan Qaboos of Oman against the PFLO, rather than a vindictive desire to punish rebellion currently typified by Assad. In this respect, recruiting ex-insurgents as auxiliaries also provide a potential ‘exit strategy’ for any external participants in a COIN campaign. During the al-Anbar Awakening and the rallying of thousands of ex-Sunni Arab guerrillas to the government’s side in 2006-2007, an implicit bargain was struck between the US military and the more nationalistic insurgent groups. The eventual withdrawal of American troops was dependent upon an end to Shia-Sunni sectarian violence, the suppression of al-Qaeda in Iraq and affiliated groups, and reconciliation between the Sunni insurgents and the government of Nuri al-Maliki. The ‘Awakening’ was therefore a precondition for the end of the Coalition occupation of Iraq in late 2011,​[76]​ although in the long term it failed to provide the basis for a lasting settlement between the Sunnis and the Shiite-dominated government.​[77]​
  
The firqat forces in Oman epitomise the potential benefits of raising surrogate forces, although the Dhofari tribal fighters did have their limitations. As the British General seconded to command the SAF noted in April 1974, they did not act like disciplined soldiers, and their willingness to co-operate with the SAF required ‘endless patience and really good Arabic’ on the part of the SAS special forces personnel assigned to train them.​[78]​ A further problem was that regular SAF soldiers and the British officers seconded to the Omani armed forces often did not trust the firqats; many of the latter were ex-insurgents, and their loyalty was still considered suspect.​[79]​ Their autonomous nature also meant that they were not suitable for conventional combat operations of the type which the SAF and the Imperial Iranian brigade group were waging against the PFLO in Western Dhofar in 1974-1975. Firqat forces were therefore employed according to their capabilities, being used as a rear-echelon security force while regular SAF and Iranian troops swept the insurgents out of Dhofar across the South Yemeni border.​[80]​ 

Qaboos’ offer of an amnesty certainly weakened the PFLO; between 1970 and 1974 797 Dhofari guerrillas voluntarily surrendered, many of whom joined the firqat forces.​[81]​ Yet Qaboos and his British advisors were careful to ensure that the Dhofari militias did not have the means to turn their guns against the SAF. Firqat forces were not issued with heavy weapons, and although they were retained as a territorial defence force after the war’s end, they were outnumbered by the Sultan’s regular military forces (the latter exceeding the former by 21,500 to 5,000 ten years after the PFLO’s defeat).​[82]​ Not only were the Dhofari irregulars were therefore left in no position to threaten the Omani state in the civil war’s aftermath, but they were also a complement (albeit a useful one) to a military campaign to defeat the insurgency, rather than a crucial element in the Sultanate’s eventual victory.​[83]​ 


The challenges of exploiting militias:

States raising militias often have to concern themselves with their reliability, particularly if the latter include former adversaries who have changed sides. In Algeria in 1956, the French believed that they had raised an effective indigenous COIN unit in the Kabyle Mountains known as ‘Force K’. In fact, Force K was heavily infiltrated by the FLN and subsequently defected to the insurgents, after killing several loyalist Algerians.​[84]​ In Iraq since the late 1950s successive regimes recruited a Kurdish loyalist force known pejoratively as the jahsh to fight the KDP and PUK insurgents. In practice, the jahsh proved to be a weak force whose morale was undermined by the barbarity of the Baath regime’s onslaught against the Kurds during Operation al-Anfal (1987-1990). As a consequence the Kurdish auxiliaries collectively mutinied and joined the peshmerga in the uprising that followed Iraq’s defeat in the Gulf War of 1991.​[85]​ 

Stathis Kalyvas observes that internal conflicts provide the opportunity for actors within the population to settle scores against rivals – whether due to clan politics, sectarian tensions, or personal vendettas – and as such militias can become a liability even if they are not actually colluding with insurgent forces.​[86]​ In the first year of Operation Enduring Freedom US forces were reliant upon anti-Taliban warlords whose loyalty proved to be equivocal. During the Coalition effort to encircle al-Qaeda’s remnants at Tora Bora in December 2001 Afghan militiamen were bribed to let Osama bin Laden and many of his followers escape into Pakistan.​[87]​ The tendency of Afghan warlords to denounce rivals as insurgents, in order to trick US and NATO forces into launching air-strikes against them, demonstrates Kalyvas’ observation about the readiness and ability of local actors to manipulate external ones to pursue their own feuds during a COIN conflict.​[88]​ It is also worth noting that a number of the Afghan Local Police formations have adopted a predatory approach towards civilians, contrary to the aspirations of their founders that they could serve as a community defence force.​[89]​ In Northern Nigeria, the Civilian Joint Task Force paramilitaries have been accused of the torture and extra-judicial execution of suspected Boko Haram ‘insurgents’; the Nigerian military authorities are also considered complicit in these abuses.​[90]​

	A further problem here concerns the possibility that external actors in COIN may engage with an insignificant local partner because of an exaggerated perception of its utility. In December 2007 US, British and ANA troops fought a week-long battle to recapture the town of Musa Qala in Helmand province from the Taliban. The initiative from this operation came from the then-Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, who claimed that a local Taliban commander, ‘Mullah Salaam’, had promised to rally to the government along with a substantial force of tribal fighters, and required a NATO-ANA offensive to support his uprising. However, by the time US and British forces went into combat on 7 December, Salaam’s anti-Taliban revolt had failed to materialise. An operation that was supposed to foster a locally-based security force therefore ended up as a set-piece battle against the insurgency. To compound matters Mullah Salaam – appointed governor of Musa Qala after its capture – proved to be incapable of administering and securing the town once NATO and ANA forces withdrew.​[91]​ 

A related problem is that the comparative weakness of militia formations often means that they become the focus of insurgent violence. In Kenya the KHG was a far softer target for Mau Mau attacks than the British Army or the colonial police force. In South Vietnam during the early 1960s the Civil Guard and SDC came under more frequent and sustained insurgent attack than the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, and as a consequence the Viet Cong was able to take over much of the countryside by 1964. In this respect, the Saigon regime failed to recognise that the weakness of its surrogates was a strategic liability, and that without military assistance they were defenceless.​[92]​

	One problem with employing auxiliaries is the risk of dependency, as governments that employ them may neglect their military and constabulary forces as a consequence. In Afghanistan during the late 1980s both the Soviet Army and the regime of Mohamed Najibullah became reliant on militia formations in the latter phases of the war against the mujahidin, and as a result the Kabul government’s own security forces atrophied. While auxiliaries such as the Uzbek Jowzjani were efficient fighters, their effectiveness depended upon Najibullah’s ability to pay them. Once the money ran out in late 1991, these irregular formations deserted and joined the mujahidin, precipitating the fall of the Communist government in April 1992.​[93]​ 

	The Russian Federation’s second war in Chechnya (1999-2009) illustrates the problems of factionalism. In order to fight separatist and radical Islamist guerrillas Moscow subcontracted military operations to Chechen surrogates, including ex-nationalist rebels from the first war (1994-1996). The enlistment of local auxiliaries minimised Federal military and security force casualties, and has also enabled Moscow to declare in April 2009 that Chechnya has been successfully ‘pacified’ under its President, Ramzan Kadyrov. However, Russia’s policies have also contributed to internecine violence between Kadyrov and his rivals (notably the Yamadayev family) and their respective paramilitary formations.​[94]​ There is also a related risk that militias may become involved in organised crime. This was evident not only in Chechnya during Russia’s most recent wars but also with the occupation of Basra from 2003-2007. During the occupation of South-East Iraq the British military authorities recruited substantial numbers of Shia militiamen into the police, facilitating the take-over of Iraq’s second city by armed factions responsible for serial human rights abuses against civilians, as well as racketeering.​[95]​ 

	The ethical consequences of employing auxiliaries need to be acknowledged, although these may be a product of deliberate calculation on the part of the governments concerned. The massacres committed by the militias employed by the Sudanese state against Southern rebels during the 1980s and the Syrian Shabiha more recently were intended by the regimes concerned to incite internecine violence as part of a strategy of ‘divide-and-rule.​[96]​ In Kenya during the 1950s, the British colonial authorities deliberately provoked a civil war within the Kikuyu tribe, using the KHG as a deniable means of both eliminating suspected Mau Mau sympathisers, and also of intimidating undecided Kikuyu into obedience.​[97]​ Even in cases where the government side does not follow this ‘divide-and-conquer’ approach, the demands of self-preservation often oblige surrogates to wage a vicious war a l’outrance against their insurgent enemies. The plight of the Algerian harkis at the hands of the FLN after 1962 is also a reminder that defeat in a COIN campaign may have limited consequences for a colonial power or external interventionists, but can have catastrophic ones for their indigenous allies.​[98]​ 

The use of militias can also exacerbate ethnic, tribal and social tensions, contributing to internal instability. In Angola earlier the Portuguese authorities discovered that co-opting UNITA had dire consequences for their efforts to form a national unity government in 1975. By this point Portugal intended a negotiated settlement in Angola which would enable it to grant independence and withdraw its forces, yet the MPLA’s bitterness over UNITA’s collaboration with the Portuguese Army contributed to Lisbon’s failure to establish a stable post-colonial order, contributing to decades of internal strife.​[99]​ During the civil war in Sierra Leone (1991-2000) the government in Freetown became increasingly reliant on the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) in its fight against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). However, the government’s reliance on the CDF contributed to military disaffection, and ultimately led to a coup in May 1997 after which the instigators became aligned with the RUF.​[100]​


Militias in the early 21st century Middle East:

The problems discussed in the previous section are exacerbated in states where regular militaries are ‘coop-proofed’ by the ruling regimes. In Western polities professionalism and efficiency within the armed forces are essential attributes if the latter are to protect states and societies from external and internal security threats.​[101]​ Yet as Risa Brooks, Daniel Byman, Kenneth Pollack and James Quinlivan have observed, absolutist monarchies and dictatorships in the Middle East have often taken deliberate measures to weaken the armed forces in order to avert a military takeover (similar to those experienced in Egypt in 1954, Iraq in 1958, Libya in 1969 and Syria repeatedly between 1951 and 1970). These include the deliberate creation of a divided and dislocated command structure; the establishment of a promotion system within the officer corps based not on professional competence but loyalty to the regime (defined by clan, tribe, ethnicity, sectarian identity or political ideology); the intrusive and coercive surveillance of the military by the security services; restrictions imposed on routine peacetime training exercises (on the grounds that these manoeuvres could provide the cover for a coup); and the promotion of regime defence forces (the latter often being better funded, armed and equipped than the regular military).​[102]​ 

These traits could be observed in the Libyan military under Muammar Qaddafi (1969-2011), which with the exception of elite loyalist forces such as 32nd Brigade was of generally poor quality.​[103]​ The same was true with Syria under both Hafez and Bashar al-Assad (where the Special Forces, 4th Armoured Division and Defence Companies were better trained and equipped than the Syrian Arab Army);​[104]​ Iraq under Saddam Hussein (with the Republican Guard, Special Republican Guard, and the al-Quds and Fedayeen Saddam militias),​[105]​ and Nuri al-Maliki (2006-2014);​[106]​ and also Saudi Arabia, with the qualitative difference between the regular army and the National Guard.​[107]​ 

	One of the observable consequences of ‘coup-proofing’ is that the militaries concerned are usually defeated in inter-state wars.​[108]​ The Syrian armed forces were worsted by their Israeli counterparts in 1973 and 1982.​[109]​ Libya’s military – including its Islamic Legions recruited from foreign Arab and African ‘volunteers’ – was humiliated at the climax of Qaddafi’s intervention in Chad (1986-1987).​[110]​ During the Baathist era, Iraqi military performance in the war against Iran (1980-1988) was mediocre, and Iraq’s armed forces were catastrophically defeated by their US-Coalition adversaries in 1991 and 2003.​[111]​ Regime measures to deliberately neuter the military led to inadequate training, poor doctrine, a generally incompetent and dysfunctional command, and low troop morale, all of which directly contributed to battlefield defeat. Some regimes may well accept this inability to wage inter-state wars if the coup-proofed military and security forces can withstand an internal revolt. Saudi security forces eventually managed to suppress the Islamist fanatics who seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca in November-December 1979, and Hafez al-Assad destroyed the Muslim Brotherhood revolt in Hama three years later.​[112]​ In 1991 Saddam Hussein rallied a sufficient number of Republican Guard and other loyalist troops to crush the Shiite and Kurdish rebellions that erupted after Iraq’s defeat in the 1991 Gulf War.​[113]​ However, in the face of nationwide uprisings regime forces may find themselves unable to cope, and may find themselves obliged to enlist auxiliaries to survive.​[114]​

	As the Libyan armed forces disintegrated and soldiers deserted to the rebel factions, Qaddafi was forced to rely on irregular formations such as his African mercenaries.​[115]​ In the more recent phase of the Yemen civil war military and security force units loyal to the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh joined the Houthi rebels who overthrew Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi in late March 2015. Saudi Arabia – which is attempting to return Hadi to power – has reportedly tried to raise a force of Yemeni tribal fighters to bolster the deposed President’s depleted forces.​[116]​ In Syria, the NDF provides the infantry support required to support the Baathist regime’s armoured vehicles in urban battles against the rebels, filling a gap in manpower left by deserting army conscripts. Hezbollah’s troops and fighters from the Iraqi Shiite militias have performed a similar role in operations along the Lebanese border, as Syrian Arab Army soldiers cannot be trusted by their commanders.​[117]​ In Iraq, General Qassem Soleimani (the commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force) reportedly runs the war effort against IS, training and orchestrating the Hashid al-Shabi militias.​[118]​ In both the latter conflicts it is the irregular auxiliaries and their Iranian patrons that are the key sources of regime support, bearing grave implications for regime stability.

	There are two further long-term consequences of ‘coup-proofing’ and militia dominance that are worth noting, the first being the attrition of the traditional regime defence forces. In Iraq, the loss of Ramadi on 17 May 2015 was attributed to the weakening of the Special Operations Forces units (the so-called ‘Golden Division’) that had defended the city for months without relief.​[119]​ In a war of attrition, the Baghdad government does at least have demography on its side, insofar as it can call on Shiite fighters to fill manpower losses in combat against IS. The Assad regime – relying on minority support from the Alawites and other communities – does not have that luxury. Recent rebel advances around Idlib and Deraa suggest that Assad’s best-trained loyalist troops (such as the 4th Armoured Division) are suffering the same debilitating combat losses as elite Iraqi government forces, the difference being that Damascus is unable to offset these casualties with recruitment for the NDF and other irregular formations. Alawite morale is reported to be dwindling, with its militiamen being unwilling to fight beyond their own heartland on Syria’s Northern coast.​[120]​ The downfall of the Assad regime has been repeatedly predicted, but if reports of a tipping-point turn out to be true then Syria’s President will either become more dependent on Iranian and Hezbollah assistance, or will discover that he can no longer hold onto whatever power he retains.

	The second concerns growing internecine violence between local allies. By providing the Iraqi and Syrian Kurds arms and air support the US-led Coalition potentially runs four risks. The first is that the supply of military and financial aid inadvertently revives historic tensions between the PUK and KDP, both of which waged a civil war in Northern Iraq during the 1990s, and both of which still maintain separate peshmerga and security forces. The second is that the already delicate relationship between the KRG and PYD breaks down, with in-fighting ensuing between the Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish communities. The third is that if Turkey intervenes militarily against the PYD/YPG in Northern Syria the Obama administration will have to address the diplomatic consequences of a clash between an important local ally against IS and a key NATO partner. The fourth is that if Kurdish and Iraqi Arab forces (either government troops or Hashid al-Shabi militias) clash over Kirkuk and other disputed territory in the North, then the USA and its allies may find itself arming both parties in the confrontation which follows.​[121]​ 








Although predicting the future is inherently hazardous, it is the author’s contention that the use of militias will remain a characteristic feature of internal warfare. In the current political and strategic environment the USA and other Western states are unwilling to intervene in conflicts similar to that against IS with expeditionary ground forces, preferring instead to rely on local allies reinforced with small military missions of trainers and enablers (personnel with specific skills such as intelligence, tactical air control and logistics), supported by air power. The weaknesses of the Iraqi armed forces, and the fact that Assad’s regime is a pariah, means that in the immediate future Western powers prosecuting the fight against IS are likely to concentrate their assistance on the Kurds, and possibly the more moderate Syrian rebel factions.

	As argued above, auxiliary irregular forces in COIN are best employed alongside the state’s military and police, working as a local security force protecting the population whilst the latter concentrate on offensive operations against the insurgency. If employed successfully, they can provide an opportunity for conflict resolution and national reconciliation, but as was the case with the KHG in colonial Kenya they can also be a tool for state terror. If they are recruited from within the community that provides the source of insurgent violence they can be a positive asset for the government cause, as was demonstrated in Oman in the 1970s and in al-Anbar province, Iraq, in 2007-2008. Even in these cases, however, formations such as the Dhofari firqats and the Sunni tribes will not necessarily eliminate or alleviate all internal opposition. At the end of the Dhofar war the British general commanding Sultan Qaboos’ troops observed that there were still significant pockets of PFLO support within the civilian populace,​[125]​ whilst in al-Anbar the city of Fallujah was never reconciled with either the Americans or the Maliki government.​[126]​ It is also worth noting that an auxiliary force may work well with Western interventionists, but could nonetheless remain alienated from the indigenous government, particularly if the latter pursue policies which inflame social, ethnic or sectarian hostilities. In South Vietnam the Montagnard tribesmen formed strong bonds with US Army Special Forces personnel, but they mutinied in 1964 after operation control was handed over to the Saigon regime. Much the same happened with the al-Anbar tribes and Maliki’s Shiite-dominated government in Iraq fifty years later.​[127]​

	Weak states may rely predominantly or even entirely on militias because of the inadequacies of their own military and security forces, and in some Arab countries the process of coup-proofing has left the likes of Iraq and Syria even more reliant on irregular forces recruited on the basis of ethnic, clan or sectarian ties to the ruling regime. During its offensive to recapture Tikrit in March 2015 the Iraqi government committed a force of 3,000 regular Iraqi Army troops, 1,000 Sunni tribesmen and an estimated 18,000 Shia paramilitaries. It does not bode well for Iraq’s sovereignty that the incompetent and corrupted armed forces of the Maliki era have been replaced by largely Shiite irregulars organised by Iranian military advisors. Militias that are beyond state control can engage in predatory behaviour that alienates the government from the civil populace (such as banditry, abuses and atrocities against civilians, and the prosecution of sectarian or ethnic vendettas), weakening state cohesion in the process.​[128]​ 

	Ideally, the current Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi should endeavour to recruit Sunnis in the fight against IS, but the figures given for government forces in the Tikrit operation suggests that the prospects for a new ‘Awakening’ are limited at best. Abadi’s own political base is also far from secure. His gestures of reconciliation towards the Sunnis have reportedly aroused a furore within the Shiite political elite. It is worth remembering that the ostensibly deposed Maliki is still the Deputy Prime Minister, and is by no means a politically marginalised figure in Baghdad. The Hashid al-Shabi militias, hard-line Shiite politicians and their Iranian backers have a vested interest in undermining Abadi as being soft on the Sunni insurgent threat, and of being too deferential to the unreliable Americans.​[129]​ In this respect, and to paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of Maliki’s political demise could prove to be exaggerated, and the Shiite-dominated government may well continue to be dominated by political parties that are intransigently opposed to any comprise with the Sunni Arabs. 

It should also be noted that the tribal rising against al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2007-2008 worked because it was concurrent with the ‘surge’ of US combat forces into the country. Earlier attempts to turn Sunni clans against al-Qaeda failed because the Americans lacked the troops needed to protect the former, and it was only the synergy between an expanded US military presence and the ‘Awakening’ which enabled the Americans to quell the insurgency in the ‘Sunni Triangle’ in 2007-2008.​[130]​ It is doubtful whether local tribal leaders will be collectively willing to support a second ‘Awakening’, having experienced both the blatantly sectarian rule of Maliki and the botched demobilisation of their militias.​[131]​ Such reluctance will only be reinforced by reports that Sunni sheikhs that have rallied to the government’s side against IS have been starved of meaningful support, and effectively abandoned to their fate by the security forces. Whether this is a consequence of official incompetence or malign neglect, this is not indicative of a strategy by the Baghdad government to seek to rally any Sunni resentment against the insurgency.​[132]​ The Sunni Arab community in Iraq is therefore caught between fear of retribution by IS, and of persecution by the government and its Shiite auxiliaries. IS itself is also seeking pre-empt efforts to revive the Al-Anbar militias by recruiting former tribal fighters who had fought alongside the Americans against al-Qaeda, in the process being prepared to exercise a degree of magnanimity in dealing with fellow Sunnis, including those who had hitherto opted to align with the Americans. This combination of punitive action and reconciliation may well forestall any attempt to rally the Sunni Arab tribes against the current generation of jihadis in Northern Iraq.​[133]​ 	
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